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Department of Sociology, Anthropology and Social Work
This paper examines the struggle between labor and management at four,
newly-opened supermarket/discount stores, culminating in a strike. It
considers workplace control as an issue in the strike and its resolution.
Edwards' typology of workplace control is reviewed, along with other
indirect forms of control explored in recent literature. Workers complained
most stridently about direct control mechanisms. Workers' objections to
technical and bureaucratic control played only a minor part in workers'
decision to strike and the work stoppage's outcome. Indirect controls,
including customer and gender-specific control mechanisms, were seldom
questioned or acknowledged by workers. On the other hand, both the
union and management recognized that customer support can influence
the course and outcome of a strike. The settlement of this eight-and-one-
half week strike resulted in slightly improved wages and benefits and
modification of some elements of direct control.
Employers attempt to obtain desired work behavior from
their employees and thus increase profits by creating structures of
control in the workplace. Employer success in creating structures
of control depends upon their relative strength and that of their
workers (Edwards 1979). Among the ways workers can resist
their employers' power over them are work slow-downs, work-
place sabotage, and strikes. Thus, employers want to institute
sufficient control mechanisms to elicit the proper behavior from
employees and to forestall more dramatic expressions of worker
power. However, if employers exercise too much control, workers
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will resist and employers' goal of procuring work from their
employees will be hurt. In this paper we explore how systems
of control affected workers at a supermarket/discount chain and
the role that control mechanisms played in a work stoppage.
This case study focuses on Meijer, Inc. and its efforts to control
workers as the company expanded into the Toledo area and estab-
lished four new stores. Besides the employer and workers, a third
party, the United Food and Commercial Workers' Union (UFCW)
that represents the workers, defined issues of significance in the
strike. The UFCW conducted contract negotiations with Meijer,
Inc. on the employees' initial contract. When negotiations broke
down, the union led an eight-and-one-half week strike against
the Toledo-area Meijer stores.
The discussion is based on interviews with forty randomly
selected workers about the organization of work at Meijer and
workers' strike interests. Some respondents struck against the
company; some did not strike. We also interviewed supermarket
managers, UFCW officials, and workers in other supermarkets.
All interviews were conducted by the authors and lasted from 20
minutes to more than one hour. We reviewed rosters of union
members at the Meijer stores following the strike, the Meijer
employee handbook, and newspaper reports on the strike.
Systems of Control
Employers and their managers develop systems of control to
increase profits by "obtaining the desired work behavior from
workers" (Edwards 1979: 17). The means of control may be direct
or indirect. Direct or simple controls require employers and/or
their agents to closely supervise their workers and continually
give their workers instructions. Because direct controls are the
more blatant form of control, workers' resistance (e.g., a strike)
may arise from or be directed at these mechanisms. Efforts to
control workers' behavior can continue, even as workers take
action to resist management's demands.
Indirect controls involve the use of impersonal, formalized
mechanisms to obtain desired behavior from workers (Blau 1968).
They are less visible to workers because they are embedded
in the structure of the workplace, instead of resting directly in
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the hands of employers and their managers, supervisors, and
foremen. Managers may indirectly control workers by burying
the mechanisms in the physical structure of the labor process
(i.e., technical controls) or in its social structure (i.e., bureaucratic
controls; Edwards 1979; also see Bacharach and Bamberger 1995).
Early labor process theorists (Braverman 1974; Edwards 1979)
focused on manufacturing because it was expanding, although
they briefly discussed retailing. As the service sector grew and
became the dominant sector in the economy, analysts (Fuller and
Smith 1991; Gottfried 1991; 1992; Leidner 1993) examined control
issues in service jobs more thoroughly. Edwards' (1979) asser-
tion that direct control is still dominant in retailing is simplistic
(Benson 1986; Fuller and Smith 1991; Leidner 1993). In her exam-
ination of a fast-food industry, Leidner (1993) found that all three
types of control--direct, technical, and bureaucratic-identified
by Edwards (1979) existed at McDonald's. However, customer-
worker interaction also constitute another form of control over
"interactive service workers"-those who interact directly with
the service recipients.
The transformation of the economy to service-based has in-
creased the opportunities for management to adopt more subjec-
tive controls (Gottfried 1992; Smith 1994). Managers in sales occu-
pations and other selected occupations may manipulate workers'
emotions, personalities, and minds (Hochschild 1983). Employ-
ers, especially in service areas, feel empowered to require workers
to perform emotional labor because as Chase (1978: 140) noted:
"Any interaction with the customer makes the direct worker in
fact part of the product, and therefore his [or her] attitude can
affect the customers' point of view of the service." This emotional
labor that workers perform may be directed at their customers
and themselves (Hochschild 1983). For example, Meijer follows
a common service-sector practice of referring to its customers
as "guests." Leidner (1993: 129) argued that McDonald's man-
agement instituted this practice to reinforce the view that "all
customers were entitled to respectful and courteous treatment
and that workers were there to serve them."
Labor analysts have extended our view of control mecha-
nisms in ways other than acknowledging customer control
mechanisms, recognizing such worker characteristics as gender
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(Gottfried 1992; Lee 1993; Smith 1994). Acker (1990: 145-46) stated
that "the control of the work process... [is] always affected
by symbols of gender, process of gender identity, and material
inequalities between women and men." Men and women often
differ in their responsiveness to management's directions (Smith
1994), and these directives can involve such work behaviors that
managers try to control as resistance, disruptive and argumenta-
tive conduct, and unionizing (Edwards 1979). For example, some
employers have favored employing women because they believe
women are more easily controlled and less likely to unionize
(Ehrenreich and Fuentes 1981; Cobble 1993).
Workers at the Toledo-area-Meijer stores were subject to all
of these mechanisms of control: direct/simple, technical, bureau-
cratic, customer, and gender. In the following sections we describe
these mechanisms, how they operated at these Meijer stores, and
what, if any, role that they played in the strike.
Workplace Control and the Meijer Strike
Direct Control
Direct control is the oldest, simplest form of worker control
and is associated with relatively small entrepreneurial firms (Ed-
wards 1979). Meijer Inc.'s roots are as a small, privately-owned
company that dates back to 1934 when Hendrick Meijer started
his first store in Greenville, Michigan. Over the years, the family-
owned business opened additional stores, spreading into small
towns across western Michigan (Meijer 1984). In 1994 Meijer had
81 stores in three states, about 55,000 employees and gross sales
of $3.5 million ("Meijer looks.. ." 1994). Today the company has
over 95 stores. This expansion includes four stores in the Toledo
area that opened in 1993. Despite this tremendous growth, Meijer
remained a private company and, as a manager described the
firm, "very secretive." He went on to say, "That's the way they
[top management] like it and that's the way they want to keep it.
They teach us to be that way."
Meijer's closed management style is compatible with direct
controls because concealing information places more power in
the hands of those people who have the information (i.e., man-
agement). It allows managers much discretion in their direction
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of workers (Edwards 1979). Workers described elements of this
personal type of control: "First, they try to make you feel like a
family. They tell you you're part of Fred Meijer's family, the Mei-
jer's family. If you don't do exactly as they prescribe, then they try
through intimidation." Another worker described management
as "always on our backs to do more and more and more, just kind
of slave drivers."
Because direct controls are subject to the whims of those
in charge, they can be "erratic, and subject to favoritism and
arbitrariness" (Edwards 1979:27). These types of decisions played
a part in the strike. Indeed, both striking workers and union
officials stressed the importance of the issue of what they called
treatment, but were in fact issues of direct control. For example,
many of the workers we interviewed complained of arbitrary
decisions in the day-to-day operations of their stores, a significant
form of control. Striking workers contended that managers gave
favored workers more hours and at preferable times.
Brown nosers would get the extra hours .... They were allowed
to get over-time.... They were allowed holidays off. I've worked
there for a year and a half and I had one holiday off. And that was
only because they were closed. And I've got top seniority in the
store.
This service-desk worker went on to say that for "unfavored"
workers, overtime could have serious ramifications.
If they would ask me to stay over, or if we were busy and I couldn't
leave..., I would have to let them know early enough in the
week so that they could cut my schedule.... If I clocked in 15
minutes overtime, that would be at time-and-a-half. They would
take disciplinary action by writing you up and putting it in your
file. If you get enough of these, then you would get time off without
pay, and enough of them, you'd lose your job.
Some workers that we interviewed reported other instances
of management's inconsistent enforcement of company rules.
One cashier explained that if a cashier's drawer was short of
cash, Meijer's policy stated that he or she would be off for three
days. However, for some workers the manager "would say, 'Well,
you've been off Monday and Tuesday, that was two days off. Next
Thursday's your next day off, and it's your next day off." Thus,
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with favored workers management may count regular days off
as part of their suspension. But as the cashier went on to explain:
"Another girl, possibly is a part-timer, or [someone who] has a
personality conflict with one of the managers, or they just didn't
like her, they'd bring her in the office and give her three days
off without pay." It was these workers' hope that their union
could help protect them from managers' use of direct control
mechanisms, such as the arbitrary disciplining of workers.
Workers also believed that Meijer management controlled
them by misleading them about its willingness to pay workers in
Toledo wages comparable to other unionized grocery-store em-
ployees in the area. This led to an impasse between the company
and the union (Morrissey and Coventry 1996). When entering
the Toledo area, Meijer met with UFCW representatives to dis-
cuss union representation. Meijer allowed the UFCW to give a
membership talk to the workers. A union organizer told us that
Meijer was aware of the higher wage/benefit standards in the
Toledo area and indicated that they would meet them in their
Toledo stores. Several workers reported to us that Meijer had
given them the same impression about wages. One women said
that when she interviewed for her job at Meijer, the company
representative told her "'the union was coming in and wages
would go up tremendously.' "During contract negotiations, how-
ever, Meijer's wage proposals fell below those earned by Meijer's
unionized competitors. For example, Meijer offered to pay their
top cashiers $6.70 an hour, which was $3.30 below the rate for top
cashiers at Kroger, Food Town, and Cub grocery stores (Pakulski
1994a).
Sticking points in the contract negotiations went beyond wage
issues. The union took exception to management's proposals for
health insurance that required workers to pay a large portion
of their premiums and a pension plan that did not cover the
entire workforce. Another point of contention was the company's
policy that gave part-time workers little chance to become full-
time (Pakulski 1994b). Striking workers and union officials also
emphasized the importance of worker treatment-a product of
Meijer's direct control mechanism. Contract negotiations even-
tually broke down, and on April 27 the UFCW membership at
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Meijer voted to authorize a strike by a margin of 596 to 107 to
begin May 10 at 12:01 a.m. (Pakulski 1994b).
Meijer's direct-control efforts increased as negotiations dete-
riorated, and worker resistance grew. Meijer, Inc. prepared for the
strike by hiring 100 additional private security guards from the
Vance International's Asset Production Team. Both newspaper
accounts and interviews of workers indicate that these security
officers proved to be a source of concern to workers. Three days
before the scheduled start of the strike, workers "flooded" their
union hall with complaints that the private security officers were
harassing union members (Henry 1994). Emphasizing the nega-
tive treatment workers received, some of the workers we inter-
viewed referred to the APT guards as the "goon squad," and saw
them as an example of management's attempts at intimidation.
Here we were cashiers and clerks out there [on the picket line],
and they were treating us like Teamsters and longshoremen. They
had goons out there, hired in from Virginia in their paramilitary
uniforms, standing at attention all the time, shooting cameras at us.
They've got video tape on every one of us.
Another union supporter told us:
When I first started my union activities, promoting people to sign up
and be union members, giving out registration cards, I was followed
to my area.... I had people watch me. I had people follow me to the
break room, sit in on my conversations, follow me to the bathroom.
It got to the point where they followed me home. They would sit
outside our house.
At 4:00 p.m. on May 7, the day workers inundated their UFCW
local with complaints, union officials decided to strike early. An
hour later, workers at one of the stores began walking out. By
5:20 union members at the other three stores were joining them.
The union reported strong support by the workers on the job that
afternoon. They claimed that 75 to 85 percent of the members
walked out of three of the stores. Only about half of workers could
leave the fourth store before the APT guards locked employees
inside (Henry 1994).
Walking off the job did not eliminate some workers' con-
cerns about Meijer's efforts to control workers through intimida-
tion. Additional incidents occurred on the picket line. A striking
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cashier indicated that the APT guards kicked, stoned and shouted
obscenities at the picketers. In an attempt to protect their striking
workers, the union filed a complaint of harassment and intim-
idation against Meijer, Inc. and APT security firm on May 26,
requesting a restraining order against them. That same day the
litigants agreed on an order to prohibit mistreatment of picketers.
Meijer's spokesperson Brian Breslin indicated that the agreement
should not be viewed as an admission of any wrong-doing, and
that they stood behind the security firm they hired. A newspaper
account quoted Breslin as saying,
We continue to maintain that Asset Protection Team is a highly
professional and disciplined labor-dispute security organization
and are highly suspect of any accusation of improper conduct with
regard to any APT employees (quoted to Pakulski 1994c: 37).
A union member we interviewed spoke bitterly a few months
after the strike ended about her experiences at Meijer. She em-
phasized that the strike was as much about the treatment of
workers as wages and benefits, and was concerned that problem
of worker treatment was not rectified. "Better treatment is very
important... . We filed over forty unfair labor practice charges
against Meijer's, and they were very serious. They were not ad-
dressed at all. They were dropped. So what has Meijer's learned
from this?"
Thus, efforts at direct control, along with wage and benefit
issues, contributed to the strike and influenced Meijer's reactions
to the strike. Technical and bureaucratic controls also concerned
workers, though less dramatically than direct mechanisms.
Technical Control
Employers developed technical control to direct, evaluate,
and sanction workers indirectly by hiding the means of control in
the physical structure of the workplace. At Meijer, the structure
of the stores function as a control mechanism. The supermarket
industry has added more and more product lines and services,
such as a pharmacy, salad bar, lunch counter, video rental, ticket
sales (Walsh 1993; Mayo 1993). Some stores, like Meijer, expanded
even further becoming "hypermarkets" where shoppers could
buy groceries as well as auto supplies, clothing, yard tools, etc.
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Although few supermarkets became "hypermarkets", or combi-
nation stores, as they are now more commonly called, they can be
found in many areas ("American food. . ." 1993; Johnson 1989).
Meijer's market strategy to offer everything from groceries to
lingerie to hardware result in stores of about 35 departments that
typically cover over an acre of land (hence their former name,
Meijer Thrifty Acres). However, the size of the stores also affected
workers' involvement in the strike and functioned as a control
mechanism.
Joining the work stoppage often followed departmental lines.
We found that the greatest worker involvement occurred in those
departments associated with traditional supermarkets. Several
non-strikers indicated to us that it was more of a grocery strike.
A toy-department worker told us that
The non-grocery area really wouldn't be considered in the strike....
Essentially, everything that they [the union] were fighting for raise-
wise or getting more full-time positions, things like that, it all had
to do with just groceries and cashiers.
Many of the non-grocery workers indicated that union position
had relatively little significance to wages and working conditions
in their departments.
Technical control embedded in the stores' structure also
helped account for non-involvement. Non-strikers' reasons for
crossing the picket line varied. Some of the non-strikers we inter-
viewed expressed an anti-union viewpoint; others simply identi-
fied more strongly with their departments. Others did not strike
because their co-workers failed to support the work stoppage.
Given the physical size of the stores, each of the Meijer stores had
approximately 500 employees, compared to large supermarkets
that employ about 200 workers. Many workers knew few people
outside their department. A furniture-department worker told us
that he started shortly before the strike and did not know work-
ers from other departments. He worked throughout the strike
because everyone in his department stayed and the strike "didn't
really affect my department." Without the support of immediate
co-workers, some workers did not view striking as an option. A
meat-department worker explained that he did not strike because
only a few of his co-workers struck. However, he indicated that
12 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
if he worked at the Meijer store from which he transferred, he
would not have crossed the picket line. Workers in the meat
department at that store participated in the strike. Thus, the size
of the store and the workers' isolation within departments acted
as mechanisms of control, deterring some workers from striking.
Workers who talked to us indicated that Meijer managers
used various technology (e.g., computerized check-outs) to eval-
uate workers (see Braverman 1974: 372). However, they qualified
management's use of the information. One cashier explained:
"they can't push you too far because they can't make you do
something that would injure you. You know, carpel tunnel." But
they do use the information as a "guideline." She went on to say
that the union plays an important role protecting workers, "acting
as a counterbalance" against management.
Bureaucratic Control
The job structure and social relations of the workplace can
function as bureaucratic control mechanisms. Different types of
bureaucratic controls are used depending on the job. Employers
stress company rules to workers in low-level jobs, but reward
employees in middle-level jobs for their dependability. Workers
at the highest level receive rewards for internalizing the firm's
goals and values (Edwards 1979). At Meijer workers receive a
company handbook that instructs them on their dress and groom-
ing, how to interact with customers, how to bag items, etc. It
also lists 46 actions that workers should avoid from parking in
unauthorized areas to theft. The company qualifies their list of
prohibited behaviors by indicating that it is impossible to include
all inappropriate behaviors. The violation of these work rules
may result in disciplinary action, including worker termination.
Meijer also has a Policy and Procedures Manual that contains
more extensive information on the 46 actions, plus additional
company policies and procedures. Workers indicated that some
of the company rules were designed to reduce workers' cohe-
siveness. One service-desk worker explained: "In the store we
weren't allowed to even talk to one another unless it was [during]
a 15 minute break... . So you don't get too close to anybody, they
[the managers] would schedule your breaks and lunches with
different people at different times.. .."
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Although the Meijer's workforce contained low-level jobs, a
store director suggested that Meijer expected their employees to
internalize the company's goals and values-a control mecha-
nism associated with high-level jobs (Edwards 1979). He told us
that when interviewing applicants he tells them:
Meijer is a tough company [to work for].., they have very high
standards. Meijer is a perfect place for someone if they have a
good work ethic. When they go to work if they give 100 percent of
themselves, Meijer is a terrific place for a person like that to work.
Someone who works and likes to give 95 percent of themselves, they
won't make it at Meijer.
However, this company that demands 100 percent from their
workers hires predominately part-time employees. Union rosters
of workers for all four Toledo-area Meijer stores show that two
months after the strike was settled, 82 percent were classified
part-time. A supervisor at one of Meijer's major competitors told
us that Kroger stores in the area have approximately 60 percent
of employees classified as part-time. In contract negotiation, the
UFCW argued for less stringent requirements for full-time status,
but with limited results.
The job of specialty clerk and its place in the job hierarchy also
was a point of contention in the labor negotiations. These deli,
bakery, seafood, and full-service meat-shop workers are among
the poorest paid at Meijer-only baggers make less-reflecting
their low status in the job hierarchy. In addition, Meijer's pre-
strike policies limited specialty clerks' ability to move into better
paying jobs (Pakulski 1994d).
Thus, Meijer uses bureaucratic control mechanisms associ-
ated with both low-level and high-level workers, part-time and
full-time employment, and company rules and guidelines for
employee behavior. Although the UJFCW supported some mod-
ification in the structure of jobs, workers we interviewed found
Meijer's list of prohibited behaviors the most frustrating dimen-
sion of bureaucratic control.
Customer Controls
Typically, employers and their managers/supervisors exer-
cise control over workers. However, in interactive service jobs,
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customers also act as agents of control (Leidner 1993). Fuller
and Smith (1991) identified three customer control mechanisms:
customer-instigated, company-encouraged, and company-insti-
gated. Customers have always had the power to complain about
substandard quality in products or services. When unable to gain
satisfaction from sales workers, customers often ask to talk to
a manager. The Meijer employee handbook (handbook also) also
instructs workers to refer all complaints to the manager-in-charge.
Meijer takes customer complaints seriously; a worker may be
disciplined if his or her mistake results in a customer complaint.
Companies often encourage customers' input by providing
comment cards or toll-free telephone numbers (Fuller and Smith
1991). Meijer has comment cards available at the service desk
upon request and a sign that reads: "We care and we want to hear
from you," with a toll-free telephone number that customers can
call. Another company-instigated method that is popular among
retailers is "secret shoppers," individuals hired to anonymously
pose as customers to monitor and report on workers' perfor-
mances (Fuller and Smith 1991). Workers and union officials
were unaware if Meijer used secret shoppers. A store director
we interviewed would not confirm or refute their use. He said:
"Corporately, I cannot answer that question." Later, a university
student told us that he had been a secret shopper at Meijer.
Prior research (Benson 1986) on salespeople found that work-
ers often view shoppers "as the enemy," because customers have
the potential of exercising control over salespeople. However,
Meijer workers often viewed their customers as just part of the
job or as their friends and neighbors. Many considered Meijer the
outsider. A cashier talked at great length about Meijer's effect on
workers, local businesses, and the community as a whole. She
went on to say that "the country and the future of my children
and their grandchildren are affected by [Meijer's actions]." Many
Toledo-area shoppers refused to act as Meijer's agent of worker
control by crossing the picket line, which would have undermined
workers' power. Data from the University of Toledo 1995 Quality
of Life Survey indicates that 58 percent of the respondents did
not go to Meijer during the work stoppage (Survey Research
Institute 1995). After the strike Meijer admitted to the press that
business was off by about 10% ("Meijer, competitors. . ." 1994:
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9). However, union supporters did not look kindly on customers
who crossed the picket line to shop at Meijer. Picketers shouted
at shoppers and tried to block cars from entering the parking lot.
One Saturday, other union workers in the Toledo area held a rally
to show their support for striking Meijer workers. After an hour-
long gathering, hundreds of people moved to the parking lot of a
near-by Meijer store. The local newspaper described their protests
as raucous and reported shoppers filing complaints about union
members' behavior. No serious injuries occurred, and the only
arrest took place at another store when a union supporter struck
a pick-up truck with his fist (Bates 1994)
At Meijer as in other companies (see Fuller and Smith 1991;
Leidner 1993), customers contributed to the control of workers.
Although workers did not object to customer controls in the work-
place, both union and management understood that customer
behavior during the strike was crucial to the interests of both
sides.
Gender Controls
Lee (1993) argued that segregation of workers into different
jobs may be the most important form of gender-based control,
although other workplace contexts also may be gendered (Acker
1990; Martin and Harkreader 1993). Meijer workers are segre-
gated by gender within multiple contexts. Although women con-
stitute 64 percent of the workforce in the four Toledo-area Meijer
stores, only three departments-liquor (60 percent female), toys,
and gas station (both 67 percent female)-had similar gender
compositions. Several departments were completely segregated.
Four departments-infant and children's apparel, women's ap-
parel, home fashion, and gifts and floral-were staffed exclu-
sively by women workers. Plumbing, paint, and hardware had
only had male workers. While other departments may not be
totally male or female, they were far from integrated. In 27 of
the 36 departments one gender dominated, comprising at least
70 percent of the workers (see Jacobs 1989).
The segregation that exists among Meijer workers mirrors the
divisions between men and women in these sales occupations
in the entire labor force. For example, women dominate apparel
sales at both Meijer (97.9 percent female) and in the labor force
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(81.3 percent female; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1992). Hardware
and building supplies are predominately male. While men com-
prise 87 percent of the occupation's workforce in the labor force
(U.S. Bureau of the Census 1992), they monopolize the positions
at Meijer; the 23 hardware workers at the four Meijer stores
are all men. Other Meijer departments vary from the national
occupational statistics. Shoe sales is fairly well integrated, with
women representing 62 percent of the U.S. workforce (U.S. Bureau
of the Census 1992). However, at Meijer the shoe department hires
predominantly women workers (88 percent female).
It appears that the division of men and women into differ-
ent work areas at Meijer equals or exceeds the segregation that
exists in the entire labor force. Segregation hides the fact that
employers and managers use gender-specific control mechanisms
(Smith 1994); workers are not treated differently because of their
gender but because they work in different departments. Previous
research (Talbert and Bose 1977) on retail clerks found that men
reported less supervision and greater discretion in their work
than female clerks. We found that men at Meijer complained
slightly less than women about close surveillance-a form of
direct control-at work.
The separation of men and women into different jobs con-
tributes to a gender hierarchy in authority (Ehrenreich and
Fuentes 1981; Lee 1993). On the Meijer organizational chart, de-
partments are subsumed under four lines-grocery, service, soft
lines, and hard lines. Each store has a manager that oversees
these lines, and the manager often reflects the gender composition
of the line's workforce. The soft line, the most highly segregated
line with 81 percent women workers, is head by a female manager
in each of the four stores. The service line that employs slightly
more male workers than the soft line (70 compared to 81 percent
female, respectively), is managed by a man in one of the four
stores. In the other three stores, women head-up the service line.
Hard-line managers, whose workforces are 53 percent female,
are evenly split; two stores have a male manager, while the two
other stores have a female manager in hard lines. One of the
female, hard-line managers recently moved into that position
from grocery, leaving the grocery-line manager position vacant.
The three other grocery-line managers are men, while 59 percent
of grocery workers are women.
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Besides each store having four line managers, each also has
a night manager and a store director. Men dominate these po-
sitions, occupying them in three of four stores. The store that
had a woman director and a woman night manager also had
predominately women line managers; only one line manager (i.e.,
grocery) was male. Thus, men and women managers are segre-
gated between stores. Although women are over-represented in
management in one store, in the other three establishments men
dominate the top management positions. These male managers
institute control mechanisms to direct, evaluate, and sanction a
workforce that is 64 percent female.
If Meijer management thought hiring mostly female workers
would make for more docile workforce, it appears they were
mistaken. Many women workers at Meijer are strong union sup-
porters and actively participated in the strike. Some took lead-
ership roles, acting as picket captains and union stewards. In
fact, women are more likely to be union stewards than men. Of
the 15 stewards identified on the union rosters, 11 were women.
Although the authority structure at Meijer is gendered, women
workers are not reluctant to serve their unions or question the
control mechanisms of management. Nevertheless, gender seg-
regation per se never came up in interviews. To a remarkable
degree, the highly gender-segregated, Meijer job structure elicited
no comment from Meijer workers, nor were treatment issues
framed in gender terms by our respondents.
The Impact of the Strike on Workplace Control
Strikes challenge and often interrupt management control,
although as the Meijer case indicates management may continue
to try to control workers' behavior through the course of a work
stoppage. Workers differed in their assessment of the impact of
the strike on Meijer's use of direct control. Some strikers thought
that things had not changed much. One non-striker commented
that the strikers "went out in vain." Some strikers also thought
little had changed. After coming back to work after the strike,
two workers in the cash office believed that management was
punishing them for their strike activities by assigning them to
cash registers. They were told that working in the cash office
was a privilege, that it appeared they no longer deserved. Others
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indicated that they were now treated more fairly. Some non-
strikers also indicated a change among managers. However, from
their perspectives it was for the worse. A man who moved from
automotive to cashier said: "They more or less really treat you just
like an employee, before [the strike ended] they kind of treated
you like they were grateful you were working there." Thus, it
appears that the strike reduced, although did not eliminate, as-
pects of direct control, to the approval of some workers but to the
dislike of others.
Although striking workers did not complain as vehemently
about other means of control, we found that some elements of
technical and bureaucratic control did change. Meijer's size, struc-
ture, and work rules that minimized worker contact with each
other produced a fractionalized workforce. However, both strik-
ing workers and union officials indicated that the strike brought
workers from different shifts and departments together. As one
worker explained, before the strike
you knew their name; you knew where they worked; and that's all
you knew about them. On the picket line, we got to know them as
people, as friends. We got to know their families, their husbands,
how many kids they had, what their problems were. They listened
to what your problems were. So it gave us a chance to get a lot closer.
And I think Meijer is going to regret that.
Union representation also modified some bureaucratic control
that management had instituted. Several workers reported that
the elements of the contract that they liked dealt with grievance
and arbitration procedures and seniority rules.
The UFCW was able to reduce some aspects of control that
Meijer management had imposed on its workers. However, the
union also placed restrictions on Meijer workers. The stores were
"closed shops," requiring all workers to join the UFCW. Those
workers whose pay did not increase under the strike settlement
lost money, as they gave up part of their pay checks to union dues.
Among those in the non-grocery areas in particular, workers did
not feel the union was representing their interests because the
UFCW did not push for as high of wages in non-grocery areas
as in grocery departments. The union argued that Meijer should
pay wages similar to their competition, both well-paying, union-
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ized supermarket and non-unionized discount stores that paid
considerably less. Unable to justify Meijer paying non-grocery
workers more than its competitors, the union may have had no
other choice but to support this two-tiered system and thereby
undermine worker solidarity.
Other workers complained that the union's success in ne-
gotiating a provision that made it easier for a part-timer to be-
come full-time actually hurt them. The settlement stipulated the
number of hours an employee could work before management
must change his or her status to full-time. During the strike,
management allowed non-strikers to work additional hours to
help staff the store. When the strike ended and the union sup-
porters returned, non-strikers had their hours reduced. Instead
of increasing the number of full-time workers, this clause in the
contract resulted in management cutting workers' hours to keep
employees from being reclassified as "full-time." In addition,
management's more lenient overtime practices only lasted as long
as the strike. One grocery employee who worked throughout the
work stoppage reported getting as many as 75 hours a week. He
blamed the union for the reduction in overtime and complained
that he "can't survive on 40 hours" per week, while accepting the
low wage rate paid by Meijer.
Other mechanisms of control were not points of contention
and did not seem to change. Although we found that customer
control reinforced other mechanisms of control, neither workers
or union officials we interviewed complained about the use of
customer controls. Customer satisfaction is such an essential part
of the retail philosophy that perhaps workers view these mecha-
nisms as fundamental to the maintenance of their jobs. In the same
way, gender differences are so ingrained (Reskin and Padavic
1994), managers and workers seemed unaware of how gender
affected the ways that the workforce was directed, evaluated, and
sanctioned.
Conclusion
Mechanisms of control affected both the formation of the
strike and its outcome. The strike was, in part, a struggle over the
means by which management obtained work from its employees.
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As expected, workers objected most strenuously to direct control
mechanisms. Indirect mechanisms of control played a less visible
role in the strike, yet they had an impact on the work stoppage.
Meijer's size, structure, and work rules produced a fractionalized
workforce that allowed management to take a tough stand in
negotiations.
When the strike finally ended, the settlement provided work-
ers with few gains. However, some elements of control were
altered. UFCW representation gave workers some protection
against management's arbitrary use of power and provided union
input on grievance and promotion procedures. Being together on
the picket line also gave union supporters the opportunity to
become closer, reducing the isolation they had felt as workers
before the strike. Although other mechanisms of control did not
change after the strike, systems of control are dynamic. They are
the outcome of the continuing struggle between management and
workers (see Edwards 1986; Gottfried 1992). While the strike and
its outcome affected some means of control, they were not perma-
nently established. The future interaction between management,
workers, and the UFCW will continue to define and redefine the
system of control at these stores.
It is, however, interesting to speculate about how issues of
control at these Meijer stores compare with other establishments.
Like workers in general, the Meijer's workforce resisted direct
control mechanisms (Edwards 1979). Indeed, as long as employ-
ers and individual managers act arbitrarily and inconsistently,
we can expect workers and their unions to object. Historically,
as workers began to rebel against direct controls, employers
and managers instituted a variety of indirect means of control.
Workers and their unions have attempted to resist some of these
indirect mechanisms, focusing primarily on technical and bureau-
cratic controls. Similar to the victories unions have won protecting
workers on assembly lines from technical control, we found that
the UFCW provides protection from management's imposing
high scanning rates for merchandise on cashiers. Unions, includ-
ing the UFCW, have also gained input regarding bureaucratic con-
trols through the shaping of promotion and grievance procedures.
However, other elements of controls, such as the size of the store in
the UFCW versus Meijer case, are less easily addressed in contract
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negotiations. Furthermore, in retailing customer controls tend
to be accepted by workers and their unions as "givens," while
gender segregation is so entrenched in the Meijer and national
labor forces that neither side of the labor conflict recognized it as
a means of worker control.
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